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I. INTRODUCTION
66PEANUT BAN ALOFT? It sounds like a Seinfeld bit: gov-
.ernment-mandated peanut-free zones on the air-
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lines . ... ,I "Coffee? Tea? Or Peanut Free?"' 2 Although
newspapers around the world have printed similarly humorous
headlines regarding the Department of Transportation's pro-
posed regulation for airlines, this is no laughing matter for pea-
nut allergy sufferers, air carriers, or even peanut farmers. The
Department of Transportation (DOT) recently sent a directive
letter to ten major airlines regarding the need for the accommo-
dation of passengers allergic to peanuts. The letter states that if
a passenger provides an airline with advance notice of a medi-
cally documented peanut allergy, then the airline must provide
an accommodation in the form of a peanut-free buffer zone.'
This zone, according to the letter, must consist of the row in
which the passenger is seated as well as the rows immediately in
front of and behind that passenger's row.4
Since the DOT declared that a peanut allergy is a disability, it
based its directive on the relatively recent Air Carrier Access Act
of 1986, which prohibits discriminatory treatment of disabled
passengers by the airlines.5 After receiving a few complaints
from interested passengers, the DOT reviewed a Mayo Clinic
study that concluded that peanut allergens can wash through
the ventilation system, but only after 5,000 hours of flight.6 Con-
cerned with the possibility of a passenger suffering an allergic
reaction merely by inhaling peanut particles in the air of the
aircraft cabin, the DOT's investigation concluded that only if an
allergic passenger ingests a peanut is there a threat of real
danger.7
The new peanut regulation poses the question of how the
DOT should create some level of protection for the one-tenth of
one percent of the population with peanut allergies" without im-
posing undue burdens on those who are not allergic to peanuts.
I Barbara Shea, On the Go, NEWSDAY, INC., Sept. 20, 1998, at E03.
2 Clarence Page, Coffee? Tea? Or Peanut-Free?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, September
11, 1998, at Al9.
3 See Scott McCartney, DOT Rules That Law Protects Fliers Allergic to Goobers; Pref-
light Searches Unlikely, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1998, at Al.
4 See id.
5 See id.; see also Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c) (1) (1988).
6 See McCartney, supra note 3, at Al.
7 See id.
8 See id. This estimate was reached by the federal Center for Disease Control
and Prevention. The number of people suffering from peanut allergies varies
tremendously among studies. In another reported study, Dr. Hugh Simpson
found that peanut allergies affect one in every 200 children and kill about 40
people per year. He also found that the number of people allergic to peanuts is
steadily rising. See Dateline NBC (NBC television broadcast, July 13, 1998).
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Some larger questions posed by the DOT's recent proposal con-
cern Congress's purpose in creating the DOT and its regulatory
functions, authority, and power. The DOT's directive has re-
ceived numerous, varied responses. Peanut allergy sufferers are,
of course, grateful for the proposed regulation. A representa-
tive of the Food Allergy Network stated, "For people with a po-
tential life-threatening allergy to peanuts, it can be very
frightening to them to be in an enclosed place where they are
surrounded by a food that could cause a severe or deadly reac-
tion."9 The airlines, on the other hand, understandably have
not received the rule with much enthusiasm. One airline repre-
sentative quipped, "What many in Washington do not realize is
that a lot of people are allergic to aviation bureaucrats, and
would like regulations which create a buffer zone between us
and them."1 ° Finally, peanut farmers, stating that their product
has been unfairly singled out and fearing that the DOT decision
will create a public frenzy leading to peanut and peanut butter
bans in schools, have loudly complained to their elected repre-
sentatives.1' In fact, congressional members have already met
with DOT representatives in an attempt to discuss the necessity
of the proposed rule.
Part II of this comment will review the history of the creation
of the DOT and its purposes, authority, and regulatory powers.
This section will also provide a brief overview of administrative
law applicable to the rulemaking procedures of the DOT. Part
III will discuss recent regulations passed by the DOT, including
regulations like the proposed peanut directive, which are man-
dated by the Air Carrier Access Act. Also, comparisons of pea-
nut allergies to other afflictions that might need
accommodations will be drawn in this section. Part IV will detail
congressional response to the peanut regulation and examine
the future impacts of the peanut proposal.
II. BACKGROUND
A. CREATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
In order to more fully understand the purposes, responsibili-
ties, and powers of the current regulatory functions of the DOT,
it is helpful to review the political, social, and economic con-
9 Food Shorts, DETROIT NEws, Sept. 22, 1998, at F5.
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cerns that led to the creation and structuring of the modern
DOT. When the Wright brothers successfully flew the first air-
plane on December 17, 1903, mankind accomplished arguably
the greatest technological achievement in history, one that for-
ever changed the world. 12 Immediately after the Wright broth-
ers' great feat, the aviation industry began to meet many of the
communications, national defense, travel, and economic needs
of our country." Not surprisingly, aeronautics quickly drew the
attention of the federal government, which began promoting
and supporting the growth of airlines, in both a financial and a
regulatory sense. 14
Historically, all levels and branches of the United States gov-
ernment have worked together to aid the country's unique and
internationally competitive transportation system."5 This multi-
level, multi-branch approach has also been used with respect to
the aviation industry. For example, early in the development of
aviation during the 1920s and 1930s, several large airlines devel-
oped to meet the needs of the U.S. Postal Service.' 6 Meanwhile,
the Secretary of Commerce was charged with regulating the
safety and maintenance of airways, airports, and air navigation
facilities. a7  Furthermore, Congress created additional in-
dependent agencies, which were delegated planning responsi-
bilities, to help regulate transportation."' One such agency was
the Federal Aviation Commission, created by the Airmail Act of
1934 to study and report back to Congress on the dynamics .of
the aviation field." Finally, the executive branch also partici-
pated in the planning and shaping of aviation policies.2
12 See 1 PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW AND REGULATION 1-2
(1992).
13 See id.
14 See id.; see also GRANT MILLER DAVIS, THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 4
(1970).
15 See DAVIS, supra note 14, at 4.
16 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 1-2. United, American, TWA, and Eastern all
were awarded federal mail contracts, and "[p]assengers rode on top, while mail
was carried in the belly of the aircraft." Id.
17 See id. at 1-3; see also PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & WILLIAM E. THOMAS, LAw &
ECONOMIC REGULATION IN TRANSPORTATION 26-27 (1986).
18 See DAVIS, supra note 14, at 4.
19 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 1-5.
20 See DAVIS, supra note 14, at 4. Arguably, transportation planning and financ-
ing activities belong to the executive branch; the economic aspects of transporta-
tion regulation constitutionally belong to the legislative branch. See U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 8.
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The airline industry was still in its embryonic stage when the
Great Depression struck.2 1 Many airlines suffered bankruptcy,
and investors, including private entrepreneurs and federal and
local governments, desired protection for their substantial in-
vestments into aeronautics. 22 Furthermore, the airline industry
was seen as unique and essential to important aspects of the na-
tional economy and national defense. 23 The concerns of the na-
tion were summarized by Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) chairman Joseph Eastman when he observed:
[I] mportant forms of public transportation must be regulated by
the government. That has been accepted as a sound principle in
this country and... in practically every country in the world ....
Transportation is of such vital importance to the public welfare
and the business is so affected with a public interest that some
measure of government regulation is . . . necessary.24
In 1938, the Federal Aviation Commission recommended that
Congress create an independent agency to regulate the air-
lines.25 Congress responded by establishing the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board (CAB).6 The CAB was fairly small and was given
jurisdiction over only entry, rates, and antitrust and business
practices.2 7 Thus, the CAB had no power over many important
concerns of the aviation industry.2 Therefore, the fragmented
regulation of transportation planning was divided between the
executive branch, which included the Department of Com-
merce, the Treasury Department, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, and the Department of the Army, and
independent agencies created by the legislative branch, which
included the Federal Aviation Administration, the CAB, the In-
21 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 1-5.
22 See id. at 1-6; see also Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil
Aeronautics Board-Opening Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 91, 97 n. 14
(1979).
23 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 1-6.
24 Id. at 1-6 to 1-7.
25 See id. at 1-7.
26 See id.; see also DAvis, supra note 14, at 4. The Civil Aeronautics Authority was
established by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. In 1940, under a presidential
reorganization plan, the Authority was redesignated the CAB.
27 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 1-7.
28 See id. These included scheduling frequency, type of aircraft, and level of
service. See id. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 restructured the Civil Aeronau-
tics Act by transferring the navigation and safety responsibilities from the CAB to
the FAA. See id. at 1-10. The Federal Aviation Administration was created by this
Act and was a subsidiary of the United States Department of Commerce until the
Department of Transportation Act of 1966. See id.
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terstate Commerce Commission, and the Federal Maritime
Commission.29
Since each executive department and regulatory agency did
little to coordinate their various transportation duties with the
other departments and agencies, this piecemeal framework of
financial assistance, regulation, and planning was largely ineffec-
tive." Due to the strong desire by congressional members and
government officials to coordinate transportation activities for
many decades, numerous proposals were submitted for the crea-
tion of some kind of federal agency that would necessarily
center the supervision of transportation activities into a cabinet-
level office." President Lyndon B. Johnson summarized both
this need and also his strong desire to create a cabinet-level
transportation department in a congressional speech by stating,
"America lacks a coordinated transportation system that permits
travelers and goods to move conveniently and efficiently from
one means of transportation to another using the best charac-
teristics of each."32 In 1966, Congress, largely due to President
Johnson's urging, passed the Department of Transportation Act,
finally establishing a single federal agency to regulate transpor-
tation.3 Under the Act, the civil aircraft accident reporting and
investigation duties were transferred from the FAA to the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)."4 In addition, the
Act separated the CAB from the Commerce Department,
although the CAB remained involved in the economic regula-
tion of the airlines. 5
Although the United States aviation industry under the eco-
nomic regulation of the CAB was "envied by every other na-
tion, '36 by the early 1970s airlines were greatly suffering due to
various economic pressures. 3 7 The CAB, therefore, heavily regu-
29 See DAVIS, supra note 14, at 42.
30 See id. at 4.
31 See id. at 4-5.
32 H.R. Doc. No. 399, at 38-9 (1966).
33 See Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat.
931 (1966).
34 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 1-10. The NTSB became independent in
1974. See ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, AIRPORT REGULATION, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY
21 (1991).
35 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 1-10.
36 Id.
37 See id. Some causes for the depressed financial state of the airlines included
excessive fleet capacity, an economic recession that decreased passenger travel,
and the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973. See id.
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lated the airlines in an attempt to avoid economic disaster.3"
Although largely successful in its regulatory efforts, the CAB suf-
fered from a political, social, and intellectual movement that
swept across the United States, demanding both deregulation
and regulatory reform.3 9 Both President Kennedy and President
Ford strongly advocated deregulation of the United States air-
line industry.4"
It was President Jimmy Carter, however, who signed both the
Air Cargo Deregulation Act of 1977 and the Airline Deregula-
tion Act of 1978 and appointed many deregulation activists into
key CAB positions.41 The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 pro-
vided for the airline industry to undergo a gradual transition
from regulation to open competition.42 Furthermore, the Act
provided for the elimination of the CAB on December 31,
1984.1' This "sunset" of the CAB marked the first extermination
of a major federal agency in American history.44 Upon the ter-
mination of the CAB in 1984, its responsibilities, mainly con-
cerning "international routes and rates, small community
subsidies, and mergers," were vested in the DOT.45 The airline
industry's deregulation was met with staunch public support
from the American people, who were optimistic about the re-
sults of the deregulation process.46
Although the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 privatized the
airline industry to a large extent, because transportation, includ-
ing-aeronautics, is a public interest, it remains regulated by the
government. 47 Therefore, the aviation industry is greatly af-
38 See id.
39 See id. at 1-10 to 1-13. See generally PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, THE SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DEREGULATION XV (1989); Robert M. Hardaway,
Transportation Deregulation (1976-1984): Turning the Tide, 14 TRANsP. L.J. 101, 136
(1984).
4o See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 1-13 to 1-15.
41 See id. at 1-15.
42 See id. at 1-18.
43 See id.
- Id. The sunset clause is attributed to Representative Elliott Levitas of Geor-
gia, "the staunchest advocate of real deregulation on either side of the Congress."
SeeJames W. Calliston, Airline Deregulation-Only Partially a Hoax: The Current Sta-
tus of the Airline Deregulation Movement, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 961, 964 n.4 (1980).
45 DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 1-21 to 1-22. Authority over antitrust was trans-
ferred to the DOT in the CAB Sunset Act of 1984 until Congress transferred it to
the Department of Labor in 1989. See id.; see also TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH
BOARD, WINDS OF CHANGE: DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT SINCE DEREGULATION 30
(1991).
4 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 1-18.
47 See id. at 3-20.
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fected by the federal DOT, a member of the group of adminis-
trative agencies, collectively dubbed the "fourth branch" of
government.48 These federal administrative agencies develop
policies, regulations, and goals for numerous areas of the law
and their regulatory decisions outweigh the combined legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial decisions "by volume and quite pos-
sibly by importance as well. '49 The DOT is no exception and
extensively regulates and controls the following areas within the
aviation industry: international air transportation, certification
for domestic common carrier operations, piloting, aircraft certi-
fication, air traffic control, and most importantly for the pur-
poses of this Comment, consumer protection. 50 Because the
scope of the DOT's regulatory authority is largely governed by
administrative law principles, it is necessary to consider a brief
overview of the general administrative framework.
B. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OVERVIEW
The overwhelming and voluminous nature of administrative
law can become confusing to those who attempt to understand
basic regulatory and administrative procedures. 51 Furthermore,
government regulation is largely unpopular with the American
public.52 This unpopularity has even reached the executive
branch as each presidential administration since Franklin D.
Roosevelt has attempted to reform the "headless fourth
branch. ' 53
There are certain principles to keep in mind when analyzing
current administrative law. Although the various agencies vary
structurally, some characteristics are common to all of these
agencies.54 First, federal regulatory agencies are created by Con-
551gress. Second, all agencies have an appointed board or com-
mission, an act to administer, and some number of
administrative lawjudges to hold hearings in order to adjudicate
complaints against the agency's decisions or regulations.56
48 See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Pro-
cess, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3 (1998).
49 Id.
50 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 3-20.
51 SeeJoseph P. Tomain & Sidney A. Shapiro, Analyzing Government Regulation,
49 ADMIN. L. REV. 377, 377-80 (1997).
52 See id. at 378; see also E.J. DIONNE,JR., WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS (1991).
53 Tomain, supra note 51, at 378.
54 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 3-20 to 3-21.
55 See WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 2 (1986).
56 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 3-21.
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Third, the discretion of agencies regarding rulemaking is enor-
mous and the vast majority of agency rules are never congressio-
nally or judicially reviewed. Finally, courts do play a limited
role in supervising the conduct of the numerous federal
agencies. 8
Because agencies are legislative creatures, they conduct
rulemaking in accordance with their enabling statute prescribed
by Congress.59 Congress has traditionally given broad discretion
to agencies in order to facilitate the necessary flexibility to make
rules in highly technical or economic areas .60 After all, regula-
tory agencies are the only government entities equipped to ac-
commodate and determine the daily decisions that flow from
the regulation of various enterprises. 61  Those grants of
rulemaking authority that contain poorly specified discretion,
however, have often been criticized as resulting in laws that are
in reality "instructions to administrative agencies that command
the public through administrative rulemaking. ' 62 There is a
concern that because new laws are coming straight from the ad-
ministrative agencies, the constitutionally granted law-making
power reserved for the legislative branch is now being usurped
by these agencies in the executive branch.63
In response to this concern, Congress passed the federal Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA) to govern the administrative
process .61 Regulatory agencies cannot allow their procedures to
fall below the minimum standards as contained in the APA, and
most agencies utilize additional guidelines separate from the
APA. 5 Regardless, the APA ensures at least some minimal level
of procedural compliance even in the absence of any specific
provisions established by Congress.66 The goal of the APA is to
strike a balance permitting efficient and effective regulation
57 See Fox, supra note 55, at 3.
58 See id.
59 See Jessica S. Schaffer, Air Transport Association of America v. Department of
Transportation: Excess Baggage for Rules of Agency Procedure, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 313
(1993).
6o See Alexander Dill, Scope of Review of Rulemaking After Chadha: Case for the Dele-
gation Doctrine?, 33 EMORY L. J. 953 (1984).
61 See Fox, supra note 55, at 4.
62 JAMES R. BOwERs, REGULATING THE REGULATORS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAUNG 9 (1990).
65 See id. at 9-10.
6 See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)
(now codified as 5 U.S.C. § 551-559 (1994)).
65 See Schaffer, supra note 59, at 314 n. 5.
66 See id. at 313-14.
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while also protecting due process and such other basic concepts
of fairness that a nonrepresentative governmental body might
suggest.67
Under the APA, Congress has set forth procedures for various
kinds of rulemaking as well as for adjudicatory proceedings. A
rule, such as the peanut directive, is defined under the APA as
"the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or partic-
ular applicability and future effect designed to implement, inter-
pret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization,
procedure, or practice requirements of an agency "68
Although informal rulemaking is a fairly straightforward pro-
cess, rarely are agency rules passed without several notice and
comment proceedings. After interested parties are given the op-
portunity to participate, the agency will reach a decision, and if
adopted, the rule is enacted into law and codified in the Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR) .69 Congress has specifically ex-
empted from APA coverage those rules that do not affect sub-
stantive rights such as interpretive rules, general policy
statements, or internal agency rules involving organization, pro-
cedure, and practice. 0
The DOT further regulates the aviation industry by adjudica-
tion.7 Under the APA, an administrative lawjudge (ALJ) must
preside over formal adjudications.7 2 In addition, the APA
prescribes certain procedures that must be followed during for-
mal adjudications.7 3 Informal adjudication, on the other hand,
has no requirements, unless a statute provides otherwise for the
particular agency. It is through this informal setting that agen-
cies develop "informal orders."7 4 Airline companies remain in-
formed about any DOT or FAA adjudication because an ALJ's
decision will likely affect the entire aviation industry.75
67 See id. at 315.
68 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1994).
69 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 3-21. "The CFR now contains over 60 million
words-about seventy times as many as in the Bible and sixty times as many as in
a complete Shakespeare." BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATVE LAW 169 (3d ed.
1998). Regulations are first published in the Federal Register and are later codi-
fied into law in the CFR.
70 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 3-23.
71 See id.
72 See Croley, supra note 48, at 113.
73 See id.
74 See id. at 114. An order is any decision that is not a rule, under the APA
definition. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1994).
75 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 3-23; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, at 213-
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C. STRUCTURE, PURPOSE, AND POWERS OF THE DOT
The United States Department of Transportation is com-
prised of six divisional units. The FAA is the largest of the six
operating units within the DOT and is the DOT's principal unit
devoted to aviation.76 The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 dele-
gated the FAA its duties regarding aviation safety. 7 Addition-
ally, the FAA participates in international aeronautics events,
such as the International Civil Aviation Organization's meetings
and activities.78
The Coast Guard, the Federal Highway Administration, the
Federal Railroad Administration, the Urban Mass Transporta-
tion Administration, and the Saint Lawrence Seaway Develop-
ment Corporation are the five remaining DOT operational
divisions.79 The National Transportation Safety Board is an in-
dependent board that initially operated within the DOT.80
However, in 1974, the Independent Safety Board Act eliminated
NTSB's association with the DOT and specifically assigned the
NTSB to "promote transportation safety by conducting in-
dependent accident investigations and by formulating safety im-
provement recommendations."' 8' The NTSB also evaluates the
efficiency and effectiveness of the safety regulations of other
governmental agencies.8 2
The purpose of the DOT is to develop transportation policies
and-programs that facilitate expedient, safe, efficient, and con-
76 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 3-5.
77 See id. at 3-5; see also Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat.
731, 49 U.S.C. §1301. The preamble of the FAA of 1958 "charges the administra-
tor (1) to regulate air commerce in such a manner to best promote its develop-
ment and safety, and fulfill the requirements of national defense; (2) to promote,
encourage, and develop civil aeronautics; (3) to control the navigable airspace of
the United States to the advantage of civil and military users; (4) to consolidate
navigation research and development; and (5) to develop and operate a common
system of air traffic control and navigation for both military and civil aircraft."
DAVIS, supra note 14, at 113.
78 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 3-6.
79 See DAvis, supra note 14, at viii-ix.
8o See id. at 144; see DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 3-7 to 3-8. The duties of the CAB
were transferred to the NTSB. A list of these duties can be found in Title VII of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.
81 DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 3-8 (quoting the Transportation Safety Act of
1974, 88 Stat. 2156, 49 U.S.C. § 1901); see also NTSB, ANN. REP. To CONGRESS 3
(1983).
82 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 3-8.
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venient transportation services at reasonable costs. 83 Addition-
ally, Congress delegated to the department the duties of
"coordinating federal transportation programs, providing trans-
portation leadership, cooperating and coordinating transporta-
tion projects with federal, state, and local government agencies,
and identifying prodigious transportation problems."84 The
DOT is necessary both for the public welfare and to
(1) ensure the coordinated and effective administration of the
transportation programs of the United States Government; (2)
make easier the development and improvement of coordinated
transportation service to be provided by private enterprise to the
greatest extent feasible; . . . (5) provide general leadership in
identifying and solving transportation problems; and (6) develop
and recommend to the President and Congress transportation
policies and programs to achieve transportation objectives con-
sidering the needs of the public, users, carriers, industry, labor,
and national defense. 5
The legislative history of the Department of Transportation
Act of 1966 is helpful in determining how Congress intended
the DOT to operate. Congress created DOT to centralize in a
Cabinet department all leadership responsibility for developing
and directing the transportation duties, policies, and goals of
the United States government.8 6 By establishing the DOT, Con-
gress sought to coordinate the 100,000 federal transportation
employees and the $6 billion in annual expenditures through-
out various departments, branches, and independent regulatory
agencies.87 The DOT is headed by the Secretary of Transporta-
tion, who is appointed by the President and approved by Con-
gress. The Congressional Committee specifically assigns to the
Secretary "responsibility for providing general leadership in the
development of national transportation policies and programs;
making recommendations to the President and the Congress for
their implementation;" all administrative and promotional du-
ties, except for safety and maritime subsidy matters; and "the
coordination of all of the farflung transportation activities of the
83 See 49 U.S.C. §101 (1994). See generally, THOMAS D. LYNCH, POLICY ANALYSIS
IN PUBLIC POLICYMAKING (1975) (discussing DOT's Planning-Programming-
Budgeting (PPB) technique of decision-making).
84 DAvis, supra note 14, at 106.
85 49 U.S.C. §101(b) (1994).




Federal Government." s8 Additionally, the Secretary is charged
with researching any technological, statistical, economic, or
other information relating to transportation services. 89
It is clear, therefore, that Congress intended to grant vast du-
ties and responsibilities to the Secretary of Transportation."°
Although some members of Congress expressed concerns about
the negative impacts that a potential overreaching of power by
the Secretary might have on existing transportation policies,
Congress was confident that there were significant checks on
the Secretary's authority.91 First, the Secretary is appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.92 More
importantly, the Secretary, although empowered to provide
leadership in transportation activities, is required to "make rec-
ommendations with respect to national transportation policies
and their implementation to the President and the Congress.""
Therefore, in proposing and implementing any potential trans-
portation-related policies, the Secretary is required to work with
Congress, which is a significant check on the Secretary's
power.94
III. REGULATIONS PASSED BY THE DOT
A. PEANUT PROPOSAL PASSED UNDER THE AIR CARRIER ACCESS
ACT OF 1986 (ACAA)
The DOT, considering a peanut allergy a disability,95 has pro-
posed that protection for peanut allergy sufferers is mandated
under the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 (ACAA).9 6 Disabled
travelers have fought with commercial airlines for equal treat-
ment in transportation services for the last fifty years. 97 Initially,
the disabled sought protection under the Federal Aviation Act
88 Id. at 11.
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 See id. at 4-5.
92 See id. at 20.
93 Id. at 5.
94 See id.
95 See infra, section III(A) (2).
96 Congress passed the ACAA specifically for the airline industry. The ACAA
applies to airlines rather than the Americans with Disabilities Act.
97 See Victoria Jensen, Statutory Sources of Protection for the Handicapped Traveler,
57 J. AIR L. & COM. 907 (1992); Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Civil Rights of the
Handicapped in Transportation: The Americans with Disabilities Act and Related Legisla-
tion, 19 TRANsp. L.J. 309-11 (1991).
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of 1958.8 The statute provided in part that air carriers have a
duty to provide transportation upon reasonable request, "to pro-
vide safe and adequate service," and to establish 'Just and rea-
sonable classifications, rules, regulations, and practices relating
to such air transportation."99 But the courts often found that
safety concerns outweighed any discriminatory airline
conduct.'00
In 1982, the CAB sought to protect handicapped travelers
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by imposing
regulations to limit, and hopefully eliminate, discriminatory air-
line practices.1"' In United States Department of Transportation v.
Paralyzed Veterans of America in 1986, the Supreme Court inter-
preted the application of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
to commercial airlines. 10 2 Section 504 establishes in part that
discrimination against an "otherwise qualified individual with a
disability" is prohibited by any program or activity that receives
federal funds or financial assistance.0 3 The Supreme Court's
determination involved whether commercial airlines were recip-
ients of federal funds and, therefore, subject to the nondiscrimi-
natory provision.-0 4 The Court held that non-subsidized airlines
were not recipients of federal funding assistance. 10 5 Since the
conduct of commercial airlines was not regulated by the Reha-
bilitation Act, in essence, air carriers were allowed to discrimi-
nate against the disabled.10 6
The Supreme Court's significant decision in Paralyzed Veterans
served as a catalyst for the ACAA, which passed three months
later. The ACAA amends the Federal Aviation Act and clearly
states that "no air carrier may discriminate against any otherwise
handicapped individual, by reason of such handicap, in the posi-
98 See 49 U.S.C. § 1374 (a) and (b) (1988).
99 49 U.S.C. § 1374 (a) (1988).
100 See Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 509 F.2d 942, 948 (2d Cir. 1975); Cor-
dero v. Cia Mexicana De Aviacion, S.A., 681 F.2d 669, 671 (9th Cir. 1982). Both
courts held that the airlines must balance safety concerns with the rights of their
passengers to be protected from discrimination.
101 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 4-45 to 4-46.
102 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
103 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
104 See 477 U.S. at 605 (1986).
105 See id. at 607.
106 See Elizabeth E. Tweedie, The Struggle for Equal Access Includes Commercial Air
Transportation: The Need for a Private Right of Action for Disabled Persons to Enforce the
Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1007, 1027-28 (1990); Den-
nis M. Lynch, The Heavy Issue: Weight-based Discrimination in the Airline Industry, 62
J. AIR L. & COM. 203, 234 (1996).
202
PEANUT-FREE BUFFER ZONES
tion of air transportation. '' 10 Senator Robert Dole, the princi-
pal sponsor of the bill, stated that the purpose of the ACAA was
to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Paralyzed Veterans as
well as to "render inoperative and inapplicable Department of
Transportation regulations which had attempted to set forth im-
plementing regulations for air carriers.' 0 8 Senator Dole also
stated that any restrictions placed upon the air travel of handi-
capped persons may be imposed only for safety reasons found to
be absolutely necessary by the FAA. 109
The intent of the ACAA was to ensure equal protection
against discrimination for handicapped airline travelers that sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides for people in other
situations. ° Therefore, as under section 504, airlines are not
required under the ACAA to make modifications to normal pro-
cedures that would constitute an undue burden or would funda-
mentally alter the nature of the carrier's services. 1' The
nondiscrimination provisions of both the DOT and the Depart-
ment ofJustice's section 504 requirements simply impose an ob-
ligation to conform policies, procedures, and facilities to a
condition that will allow for the provision of nondiscriminatory
services to persons with disabilities. 1 2
In March 1990, the DOT published several rules to imple-
ment the ACAA. These rules, codified at 14 C.F.R. part 382,
involve both administrative and general procedures regarding
the required services and physical facilities that must be pro-
vided to disabled passengers.113 Therefore, there are several
codified rules the airlines must follow to be in compliance with
the ACAA. For example, airlines may not require advance no-
tice that a handicapped passenger will be travelling, although if
the air carrier must prepare to provide certain accommodations,
such as providing oxygen, the carrier may require up to forty-
.07 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c)(1) (1988).
108 132 CONG. REc. 21, 720, 771 (1986) (statement of Sen. Dole).
109 See id. at 771.
110 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel, 63 Fed. Reg.
10,528, 10,529 (1998) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt 382).
111 See id.; see also Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Air Travel, 55
Fed. Reg. 8008, 8011 (1990) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382.
112 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel, 63 Fed. Reg.
at 10,529.
113 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Air Travel, 55 Fed. Reg.
8008 (1990) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382).
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eight hours' notice.1 14 The regulations further provide for situa-
tions involving accommodations for wheelchairs and other simi-
lar devices, extraordinary personal care, and seating
selections.115 "In short, [the airlines] cannot discriminate
against disabled passengers and they must make reasonable ac-
commodations for these individuals."" 6 Airlines are not re-
quired, however, to provide separate or different services unless
necessary.1 1
7
Courts have already seen a fair amount of litigation involving
violations of the ACAA, particularly concerning the availability
of private causes of action as well as the amount and type of
damages.1 1 8 In Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the Eighth
Circuit concluded that mental suffering or emotional anguish
damages are available under the ACAA.1 19 The Fifth Circuit
awarded both compensatory damages for emotional distress and
punitive damages under the ACAA in Shinault v. American Air-
lines, Inc.120 Finally, the D.C. Circuit held that there was not a
private cause of action available under the ACAA in Anderson v.
USAir, Inc., a case involving whether the airline could refuse to
seat a blind person in an emergency exit row.121
1. Recent Regulations passed under the ACAA
In the March 1990 amendments to the rules published by the
DOT in the Federal Register, the supplementary summary of the
rules provides an explanation of the factors and interests that
the Department considers when proposing implementation of
the final rules.1 22 As already mentioned, the regulations may
not impose "undue financial or administrative burdens" or re-
114 See id.; see also LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW 429 (2d ed.
1984).
115 See 14 C.F.R. § 382 (1998).
116 Lynch, supra note 106, at 235.
117 See 14 C.F.R. § 382 (1998).
118 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 114, at 430.
119 881 F.2d 566, 571 (8th Cir. 1989) (involving a 14-year old with cerebral
palsy who suffered distress from airline personnel's refusal to accommodate).
20 936 F.2d 796, 805 (5th Cir. 1991) (involving a quadriplegic who was not
allowed to deboard until after all the other passengers had exited the plane). But
see ADAPT v. Skywest Airlines, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 320 (D. Utah 1991) (holding
that there were no punitive and emotional distress damages available when the
airline refused to allow a woman in a wheelchair to board the plane without an
attendant capable of assisting her during flight.
121 818 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1987).




quire fundamental changes in the carriers' programs. 123 This
principle is well-settled by statute and through the applicable
case law. No clear demarcation exists, however, between "due"
and "undue" burdens. 12 4 A "bright line" has not been drawn by
either legislation or by judicial interpretation. 125 The DOT
readily recognizes that a weighing and balancing of interests
must take place. 126 Among these interests are the private sec-
tor's legitimate and driving desire to make a profit and the air-
line industry's size as a whole. Because the airline industry is so
large, there is a significant amount of resources available to ac-
commodate disabled passengers. 127 In applying this balancing
test, the Department declined to adopt a precise definition of
what constitutes an "undue burden. ' 12 Instead, the DOT will
continue to consider both the needs and the costs for the vari-
ous proposed accommodations. "The regulation[s] [are] in-
tended to strike a reasonable balance between disability groups'
concerns about sufficient accommodations being provided and
carriers' concerns about the costs of those accommodations. " 129
In March 1998, the DOT amended its rules implementing the
ACAA and further discussed the considerations to be weighed in
formulating and passing regulations.1 3 0 The DOT reiterated
that air carriers are not required to make modifications consti-
tuting either undue burdens or fundamental alterations of the
basic nature of the airlines' service.1 3 1 Additionally, carriers
must not make accommodations that would violate any FAA
safety provisions. 132 The DOT also decided that the definition
of an undue burden or fundamental alteration, consistent with
section 504 and with the ADA procedures, is a judgment call
that can only be made on a case-by-case basis.1 33 According to
the DOT, this policy approach to making modifications is well-
123 See id. at 8011; see also Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S.
397, 413 (1979); APTA v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).







130 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel, 63 Fed. Reg.
at 10529.
131 See id. at 15,529.
132 See id.
133 See id. at 15,529-30.
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established and has prevailed in existing ACAA
interpretation. '34
At this point, in order to further grasp the Department's judg-
ment of what is a fair regulation (one that does not impose an
undue burden or fundamental alteration), it is helpful to ana-
lyze the two most recent regulations passed under the 1998
amendments. Generally, the purpose of the amendments was to
clarify the nondiscrimination obligations of carriers. The
amendments further establish that carriers must, if needed,
modify various policies, practices, and facilities, even if that par-
ticular accommodation was not specifically set forth in part 382,
in order to provide adequate service to handicapped persons, as
consistent with the standards of section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act.13 5
The Department's first proposed rule, which the DOT later
adopted, involved the necessity for carriers to make available to
disabled passengers four different types of seating accommoda-
tions.13 6 The carrier can require up to forty-eight hours notice
for these requests, and although by providing these accommo-
dations the airline may have to reassign some passengers to dif-
ferent seats, the air carrier is not required to "bump" a
passenger from a flight.'3  The carrier also must continue to
follow FAA safety rules, including the seating rules regarding
exit rows.' 38 The four seating modifications include the follow-
ing: (1) seats with movable aisle armrests for wheelchair users,
(2) seats for personal care attendants (PCAs) next to the dis-
abled passengers needing the PCA's services in flight, (3) seats
in bulkhead or non-bulkhead rows for those traveling with ser-
vice animals, and (4) seats with additional leg room for those
passengers with fused or immobilized legs.1 39
When first published in the Federal Register, this proposal re-
ceived numerous comments from both the disability community
and the air carriers. The disabilities groups argued that even if
some passengers had to be reassigned to different seats, this in-
convenience did not outweigh the disabled passengers' need for
134 See id. at 10,529.
135 See id. at 10,528.







seats that were both readily accessible and useable. 40 Their
comments also stated that these seating accommodations did
not impose an undue burden or a fundamental alteration on
carriers."' Handicapped groups further argued that the DOT
should require that the modifications go even further in accom-
modating disabled travelers, such as eliminating the advance no-
tice requirement and broadening the "under-inclusive" rule to
include additional people who suffer from other disabilities by
structuring the rule in an "including but not limnited to ... fash-
ion. "142 The suggested groups include those who suffer from
multiple sclerosis, needing a seat near the entrance of the air-
craft because of the difficulty of walking, and those with bladder
or bowel control problems, needing an aisle seat near the
lavatory. 4
3
Air carriers objected to the proposed seating accommoda-
tions on several grounds. Most importantly, they argued that
implementing this rule would be very difficult due to the limita-
tions of their computer reservation systems."' In order to mod-
ify existing seating procedures and be able to alert passengers of
a change in seating assignments, the airlines would either have
to change their computer system or comb through individual
passenger records, both of which would be costly and unduly
burdensome, according to the airlines.'45 Carriers also argued
that "it was unfair to impose inconvenience on other passengers
who had expectations of sitting in their original seat assign-
ment[s] .... "I46 Since passengers might have desired their re-
served seats for particular reasons, such as being tall, traveling
with infants, or simply preferring an aisle or window seat, the
airlines believed that this rule would create confusion, increase
passenger dissatisfaction, lead to denied boarding claims and
flight delays, and generally distract flight attendants from their
respective safety responsibilities.'4 7 A final argument that the air
carriers made against the proposed rule is the legal argument
that the rule exceeds the DOT's authority of ensuring nondis-
140 See id.
141 See id.
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crimination since the rule would require "preferential" treat-
ment and "affirmative accommodation" for disabled passengers.
Additionally, by changing the airlines' "first-come/first-served"
seating assignment policy, the airlines would be fundamentally
altering the carriers' services.
As stated, the DOT decided to adopt the rule, with few sub-
stantive changes. The DOT clearly rejected the air carriers'
characterization of this rule as preferential treatment that ex-
ceeds the DOT's authority under the ACAA. 148 According to
the DOT, this rule, which requires airlines to provide all passen-
gers with a seat that the passenger can readily access and use, is
simply compelling nondiscriminatory seating policies.14 The
DOT further states that a facially neutral policy, such as "first-
come/first-served" arrangement, is in fact discriminatory if it
provides readily accessible and usable seats to nondisabled pas-
sengers but fails to provide these same accommodations for dis-
abled passengers. 150  The DOT maintains that this rule is
necessary to carry out the congressional intent of mandating
nondiscriminatory air travel.15 ' Further, the DOT argues that
the seating accommodation requirement does not fundamen-
tally alter the nature of the carriers' business because the rule
provides that no passenger will be bumped from a flight and
that the airline will continue to follow all FAA safety rules. 52
According to the DOT, the airlines may continue their previ-
ous seating reservation policies, with exceptions when netessary
to accommodate disabled passengers. The airlines' main com-
plaint relates to the problems inherent in notifying passengers
that their reserved seating assignments have been changed due
to the accommodation of a disabled passenger. 1- 3 The DOT ac-
cepted that the carriers might have limitations due to their com-
puter reservation systems; however, these problems do not result
in an undue burden, according to the Department. 54 The DOT
suggests several alternate methods of handling the modifica-
tions and notification procedures without having to change the





152 See id. at 10,531-32.
-3 See id. at 10,532.




entire computer system.155 In the DOT's opinion, the best way
to notify passengers that their seating assignments are subject to
reassignment if necessary to accommodate a handicapped pas-
senger is at the time the passenger reserves the seat. The pas-
senger could be notified either by an airline reservationist,
travel agent, screen notice, or recording, depending on how the
passenger made the reservation.'56 Other methods of notice are
also acceptable, but the DOT strongly encourages airline carri-
ers to place stickers or decals on the armrests or tray tables of
the reserved seats with an accessibility symbol and "Priority Seat
for Passengers with Disabilities" in order to help all airline pas-
sengers become informed about the new rule.157 According to
the DOT, air carriers do not have to change their computer sys-
tems because there are alternate methods of notifying passen-
gers; therefore, the burden placed on the airlines in not
undue.158
The DOT further maintains that airlines can devise other
methods to comply with the seating accommodation require-
ment, as long as the method is approved by the Department in
writing.'59 The DOT states that the implementation of this rule
minimizes the burden on carriers and the inconvenience to
nondisabled passengers. 60 Importantly, the Department con-
cludes that although "[t] he Department has a statutory responsi-
bility to ensure nondiscrimination on the basis of disability,
there-is no parallel mandate to preclude inconvenience to other
passengers who may prefer some of the same seats that are
needed to accommodate a disabled passenger. ' 161 Therefore,
the rule was passed with some modifications, such as expanding
the category of persons travelling with PCAs to include blind
persons traveling with a reader and deaf persons traveling with
an interpreter. 16 2 The airline must only provide the seat accom-
modations for the PCA if the PCA is actually going to provide
services to the disabled passenger during the flight.'63 The rule
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fused or immobilized leg an accommodating seat on the side of
the aisle that is more useful to the passenger.164
The second rule passed in the 1998 Amendments proposed
adding "collapsible, folding, or break-down electric wheelchairs
to existing provisions requiring in-cabin storage for manual
wheelchairs." '65 The implementation of this rule would also be
subject to FAA rules for carry-on items, and carriers would con-
tinue to follow all applicable DOT rules for hazardous materials
with respect to the removal, packaging, and stowing of batter-
ies. 166 This proposal was not heavily debated because both carri-
ers and disabilities groups largely supported it. 167
Under the 1998 Amendments, there are several other regula-
tions that the DOT is currently considering.'68 These proposed
regulations were published by the DOT in order to solicit com-
ments from both the air carriers and the disabilities groups, as
well as any other interested parties.169 Some of these suggested
regulations include the "captioning of in-flight movies, on-board
TDDs where air phones are made available to other passengers,
better message service in gate areas," and "the provision of a
smoke-free accessible path through airports for persons with re-
spiratory disabilities. "170 Although deferring these decisions for
now, it is clear that the DOT will weigh the needs of disabled
travelers and the air carriers' costs in accommodating these
needs and will then create regulations dealing with these partic-
ular concerns.17 '
2. Is a Peanut Allergy a Disability Under the ACAA?
In its August directive sent to all major airlines regarding the
establishment of peanut-free buffer zones, the DOT clearly im-
plied that peanut allergies are within the definition of a disabil-
ity.172 In fact, most likely because the DOT simply stated that a
peanut allergy is a disability that must be accommodated, there
has been no discussion of whether peanut allergies constitute a
164 See id.




l-S See id. at 10,529.
169 See id.
170 Id.
171 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel, 63 Fed. Reg.
at 10,529.
172 See McCartney, supra note 3, at Al.
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disability under the ACAA. The debate in Congress did not in-
clude any discussion of this issue, and the DOT, in its limited
published remarks regarding peanut-free buffer zones in the
Federal Register, neither explained nor justified why a peanut
allergy should be considered a disability.17 3 As discussed earlier,
the intent of the ACAA was to ensure the same guarantee of
equal protection against discrimination for qualified handi-
capped individuals that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
provides for people in other situations.174 Under the ACAA, a
qualified handicapped individual is defined as an individual
who purchases a ticket, meets all reasonable contract require-
ments for passengers, and presents oneself for travel. 17 5 A hand-
icapped individual is defined in the same section as one who
"has a physical or mental impairment that.., substantially limits
one or more major life activities, has a record of such an impair-
ment, or is regarded as having such an impairment."
176
There is relatively little judicial interpretation of what consti-
tutes a disability under the ACAA. The definition in the ACAA
of a handicapped person is identical to the definition in the Re-
habilitation Act. Furthermore, the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), which was passed in 1992 and contains the same def-
inition of a handicapped individual, has spurred much litigation
over the definition of disability.177 Case law regarding the defi-
nition of a disability under both the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA is applicable to the ACAA as well.
On January 6, 1999, the Eighth Circuit held that Megan Land,
a little girl with a severe peanut allergy, was not disabled within
the definition of the ADA in Land v. Baptist Medical Center.
1 78
After Megan suffered two allergic reactions, in the form of hives
and splotches, to peanuts while at Baptist Medical Center's
(Baptist) day care, Baptist refused to continue providing day
care services to her. 179 Megan's mother, the plaintiff, alleged
173 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel, 63 Fed. Reg.
at 10,529.
174 See id.
175 See 14 C.F.R. § 382.5 (1999); see also Lynch, supra note 106, at 234-35.
176 14 C.F.R. § 382.5 (1999).
.77 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), (b) (1) (E) (1994). Although airlines were specifi-
cally excluded from the ADA because of the existence of the ACAA, the analysis
of what constitutes a disability under the ADA is largely the same as under the
ACAA.
178 Land v. Baptist Med. Ctr., No. 98-2019EA, 1999 U.S. App. WL 2643 (8th
Cir. Jan. 6, 1999).
179 See id. at *1.
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that her daughter was disabled and sued under the ADA and the
Arkansas Civil Rights Act. After the district court granted sum-
mary judgment for Baptist, the plaintiff appealed, and the
Eighth Circuit later affirmed that Baptist was entitled to sum-
mary judgment as a matter of law. 181
The court agreed that Megan's allergy is a physical impair-
ment, defined by the ADA as a physiological disorder affecting
body systems such as digestion and respiration. 81 The court fur-
ther agreed that eating and breathing are major life activities
within the realm of the ADA. 182 Therefore, the court deter-
mined that the essential inquiry is whether Megan's allergy sub-
stantially limits her ability to eat or breathe. Stating that this is a
fact-specific and individualized question, the court first genera-
lized that substantial limitation of a major life activity would oc-
cur if the person "is unable to 'perform a basic function that the
average person in the general population can perform' or is sig-
nificantly restricted in 'the condition, manner, or duration
under which [one] can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to an average person in the general population." 3
Turning to Megan individually, the court held that although
her allergy affects her ability to eat and breathe in that she can-
not eat foods containing peanuts or their derivatives, her physi-
cal ability to eat and breathe is otherwise unrestricted.1 84
Therefore, according to the majority, her allergy does not sub-
stantially or materially limit these major life activities within the
definition of disability under the ADA. The lone dissenting
judge, however, argued that Megan's allergy substantially limits
a major life activity, as she is "exquisitely sensitive" to peanut-
laden foods. 85 He agreed that the risk of accidental ingestion
of a peanut was slight, but stressed the potential for serious in-
jury or death (resulting from anaphylactic shock). He cited a
Department of Agriculture rule stating that although persons
with food allergies do not generally qualify as handicapped per-
sons, when "food allergies may result in severe, life-threatening
180 See id.
181 See id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (i) (1998).
182 See Land, 1999 WL 2643, at *1 (holding that life activities include those
"central to the life process itself' such as caring for one's self, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working).
183 Id. (quoting Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1206 (8th Cir.
1997)).
184 See id.
185 See id. at *3 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
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reactions... the participant then meets the definition of 'handi-
capped person.'"186
Therefore, according to the most recent case law, it is not
clear whether peanut allergies constitute a disability. According
to Land v. Baptist Medical Center, it appears to be an individual-
ized inquiry under the facts specific to the particular circum-
stance. This determination, remaining open to judicial
interpretation, is pivotal regarding the provision of federally-
mandated peanut-free buffer zones. If peanut allergies do not
constitute a disability, then air carriers cannot be federally re-
quired to accommodate those passengers allergic to peanuts.
Of course, airlines can establish, and most carriers already have,
company policies that accommodate people with peanut aller-
gies as well as other specific individualized afflictions.
3. Is the Proposed Peanut Regulation an Undue Burden?
Assuming that peanut allergies do constitute a disability that
airlines must accommodate, the issue now becomes determining
what is a reasonable accommodation. In the March 1998
amendments to the rules implementing the ACAA, the DOT ex-
plained its policy approach of balancing interests in making fair
regulations by discussing food allergies for the first time. The
DOT has received a few requests for accommodations from air-
line passengers who are severely allergic to peanuts. 18 7
Although peanut allergies, or even food allergies in general, are
not directly or indirectly mentioned in the text of part 382 of
the CFR, the DOT has nevertheless worked informally with both
airlines and passengers to arrange an adequate modification to
the airlines' established food services and provisions on certain
flights. 18 8 An example in this situation of a regulation that does
not constitute an undue burden is an airline's voluntary serving
of an alternate snack, such as pretzels, to the allergic passenger
and to passengers who are seated nearby. 8 9
186 Id. This rule, interpreting the meaning of the word "handicapped" for per-
sons with food allergies according to the Rehabilitation Act, 7 C.F.R. § 15b.1
(1998) is designed to guide schools in deciding whether certain meal substitu-
tions for handicapped persons are required in food programs administered by
the Department. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF AGRIC., MEAL SUBSTITUTES FOR MED-
ICAL OR OTHER SPECIAL DIETARY REASONS, FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE INSTRUC-
TION 783-2, Rev. 2 (Oct. 14, 1994).
187 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel, 63 Fed. Reg.
at 10,529-30.
1- See id.
189 See id. at 10,530.
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The Department has also received more drastic requests from
peanut-allergic passengers, such as a special cleaning of the air-
craft to ensure that peanut residue does not remain on board or
a screening of all passengers to ensure that they do not bring
snacks with peanuts on the flight. 190 Declaring these sweeping
actions to be unduly burdensome on the part of the carriers, the
DOT has not requested airlines to undertake such precaution-
ary measures.' The DOT uses the peanut allergy debate as an
example of the Department exercising case-by-case judgment on
the reasonableness of the expectation or accommodation as well
as the cost that the proposed regulation would impose on the
carrier. 192
As the DOT stated in the April 1998 regulations, the question
of the necessity of the peanut buffer zone is one that the DOT
must answer on the basis of the projected costs that the modifi-
cation would impose on the carrier and the reasonableness of
the requested accommodation. 9 ' The projected costs of the
proposed peanut regulation include the hassle and expense of
reassigning seat reservations to accommodate allergic passen-
gers, the possible unhappiness of passengers with the inconven-
ience imposed by the regulation, and any increase in price for
an alternative snack. As the above analysis of the two most re-
cent regulations passed by the DOT under the ACAA shows, the
DOT is willing to impose some additional costs for implement-
ing the modifications on the carriers. The DOT would 'most
likely apply the same analysis as it applied in similar seating ac-
commodation rules, discussed infra, in determining the burden
of reassigning seat assignments and inconveniencing nondis-
abled passengers. 94 Particularly important is the DOT's state-
ment that, in ensuring nondiscrimination, any inconvenience
imposed on nondisabled passengers, i.e., their desire for the
seat that is assigned to a peanut allergy sufferer, is not a great
concern. 95 Therefore, the air carrier would most likely lose on
an argument that the costs of implementing peanut-free buffer
zones is prohibitive.
19o See id. at 10,529.
191 See id.
192 See id.
193 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel, 63 Fed. Reg.
at 10,529.




The reasonableness of the peanut regulation, however, is still
questionable since only one-tenth of one percent of the popula-
tion suffers from serious peanut allergies."a 6 Furthermore, while
an episode of anaphylactic shock can be fatal, there is no docu-
mented case that a passenger allergic to peanuts has suffered
such a severe reaction to peanut particles on an airplane. 9 '
Therefore, the proposed regulation is based on remote fears of
a potential reaction rather than a documented emergency ne-
cessitating a regulatory response.
Air carriers could also argue for a less sweeping alternative
that would protect those passengers with peanut allergies. For
example, the DOT could require that all airlines carry an epi-
pen, which is an epinephrine injection that is a recognized treat-
ment for anaphylactic shock, in their first aid kits on all flights.
This would ensure that carriers are prepared to assist a passen-
ger in the remote possibility that his or her allergic reaction to
the peanut particles leads to an episode of anaphylactic shock.
But, any alternative requiring treatments administered by flight
attendants, such as an epi-pen shot, gives rise to other liability
issues. For instance, would air carriers impose upon all or some
flight attendants mandatory training sessions on how to adminis-
ter an epi-pen shot to a passenger suffering from anaphylactic
shock? And if so, would these trained flight attendants be held
to a higher degree of care? Also, if a passenger has an allergic
reaction and is given the epi-pen shot, would the pilot have to
land the airplane in order to get the passenger to a hospital as
quickly as possible?198 These questions and other liability issues
are beyond the scope of this Comment but should be consid-
ered in an attempt to reach an alternative to mandatory peanut-
free buffer zones.
B. PEANUT ALLERGIES COMPARED TO OTHER AFFLICTIONS
1. Smoking
The hotly contested debate regarding the necessity of ban-
ning smoking on various types of flights is probably the most
popular example of regulation within the industry that directly
196 See McCartney, supra note 3, at Al.
197 See id.
198 See generally Amanda Christine Dake, The Application of "Out-of-Hospital" Do
Not Resuscitate Order Legislation to Commercial Airline Travel, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 443
(1997) (discussing similar questions regarding flight attendants' use of defibril-
lators on passengers while in flight).
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affects the comfort, safety, and health of passengers as well as
airline employees. Almost a decade after the Surgeon General's
report in 1964 on the dangers of smoking, the CAB first pro-
posed regulations restricting smoking on aircraft. 199 The CAB
and Congress considered several rules, ranging from banning
smoking on aircraft completely to creating no-smoking and
smoking sections to rescinding all smoking restrictions. The
CAB's statutory authority to regulate smoking was challenged
twice and was upheld by both the Fifth and the D.C. Circuit
Courts.2 0
The problems of smoking, however, can easily be distin-
guished from peanut allergy considerations. First, second-hand
smoke endangers all passengers while peanuts pose a danger
only to a fraction of the population. 1 Second, scientific studies
have shown that cigarette smoke in an aircraft cabin significantly
affects the health of both passengers and employees.2 0 2 In con-
trast, there is no documented case of a passenger having an al-
lergic reaction to peanut particles circulating in the air of the
cabin. Finally, smoking was banned largely because of a broad
public health concern regarding the dangers of smoking across
the nation and not on the basis of discriminatory conduct
against passengers allergic to smoke. Therefore, while the De-
partment's rules prohibiting smoking on all domestic flights op-
erating within the continental United States are an example of
extensive DOT regulation of the airline industry, these rules are
readily distinguishable from federally-mandated peanut-free
buffer zones.
2. Special Dietary Needs
Passengers have numerous other special dietary needs for
which the airlines have already established accommodating pro-
cedures. For example, Delta Airlines offers the following meal
choices to its passengers: kosher, gluten free, low cholesterol/
low fat, low sodium, vegetarian, Hindu, diabetic, low calorie,
199 See DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 4-41.
200 See Diefenthal v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 681 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1982); Ac-
tion on Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 699 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
201 See McCartney, supra note 3, at Al. Also, the potential threat of peanut
particles floating in the cabin air will only affect those people with the most se-
vere peanut allergies.
202 See generally To Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transp., 101st Cong. (1989).
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Moslem, bland, and several others. °3 To request one of these
meals, passengers must contact the airline at least twelve hours
ahead of the first segment of the flight and then identify them-
selves to the gate agent and flight attendant in order to receive
the meal suiting their particular needs.0 4 Other airlines that
serve meals on their flights have similar procedures for accom-
modating particular dietary needs.
Passengers allergic to peanut-laden food could utilize this
same procedure. In fact, several airlines have stated that within
the past several years passengers with peanut allergies have in-
deed called ahead to make prior precautionary arrangements. 20 5
The airlines have accommodated these travelers by serving nut-
free meals or by simply serving an alternate snack such as
pretzels on the flight.20 6 Air carriers have utilized this method
because there are so few peanut-allergenic passengers who need
accommodation, and serving pretzels rather than peanuts is
much simpler than trying to create peanut-free buffer zones by
rearranging previously assigned seating. Further, simply serving
an alternate snack to all passengers would be much less likely to
create nondisabled passenger dissatisfaction due to reassigned
seats.
IV. CONGRESS SENT PEANUT RULE BACK TO THE DOT
On September 11, 1998, Senators Coverdell and Shelby sub-
mitted a resolution, which was referred to the Senate Commit-
tee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, attacking the
DOT's proposal for peanut-free buffer zones.20 7 In this resolu-
tion Senator Coverdell stated "that the Secretary of Transporta-
tion should exercise reasonable judgment in promulgating
regulations relating to airline flights and should rescind the di-
rective to establish peanut-free zones on airline flights. 2 0 8 Sena-
tor Coverdell listed several reasons for rescinding the
regulation, emphasizing the tiny fraction of the population al-
lergic to peanuts and the resulting subrogation of 99.9% of the
203 See Delta Airlines, During Your Flight-Meals (visited Jan. 26, 1999) <http://
www.deltaairlines.com/trip.a2z/during/meals.htm>.
204 See id.
205 See Kathleen Doheny, Airline Policy on Peanuts Is Mixed Bag After DOT Raised
Allergy Concerns, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1998, at L12.
206 See id.
207 See S. Con. Res. 117, 105th Cong. (1998).
208 Id.
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nonallergic traveling public's rights.2 °9 Senator Coverdell also
pointed out the inherent unfairness of singling out one prod-
uct, peanuts, while ignoring all other allergens to which passen-
gers might be allergic. 21" He further stated that the nature of
the regulation is excessive and that the only potential danger to
allergenic passengers is accidental ingestion of peanuts. 211 He
concluded by expressing concern about the probability of the
needless establishment of allergen-free zones for all public trans-
portation, including buses, trains, subways, and cable cars.212
On October 19, 1998, Congress prohibited the use of funds,
which are available under the omnibus appropriations for the
fiscal year 1999, received by the DOT "to implement, carry out,
or enforce" the peanut regulation or any other regulation that
restricts the distribution of peanuts until 90 days after the sub-
mission of a peer-reviewed scientific study to Congress and the
Secretary of Transportation. 213 This scientific study must show
"that there are severe reactions by passengers to peanuts as a
result of contact with very small airborne peanut particles of the
kind that passengers might encounter in an aircraft. 214
A. DOT MAY SEND PROPOSAL BACK TO CONGRESS AFTER
FURTHER SCIENTIFIC STUDY
If the DOT conducts a scientific study and discovers conclu-
sive results as to the potential for severe reactions by peanut al-
lergy sufferers due to airborne peanut particles, then Congress
must consider the reasonableness of the proposed peanut regu-
lation once again. The biggest congressional concern with the
proposed regulation seems to be the DOT's admission that the
only danger to allergenic passengers is accidental ingestion of
peanuts. 215 The DOT most likely will have to prove conclusively
that peanut particles floating through the air in the aircraft
cabin can lead to severe reactions from allergic passengers in
order to gain congressional approval of the proposed regula-
tion.216 This will be difficult to prove because there is not a sin-





213 H.R. Rep. No. 98-825, 105th Cong. (1998).
214 Id.
215 See S. Con. Res. 117, 105th Cong. (1998).
216 See H.R. 4328, 105th Cong. (1998).
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Perhaps the next biggest concern is that federally-mandated
peanut-free zones will lead to similar regulations for other aller-
gies.21 The most severe peanut allergies can be fatal, and this
fact can separate them from other allergies that cause only mi-
nor irritation or annoyances. However, there are numerous
other foods, such as shellfish, milk, eggs, tree nuts, and wheat
(to name the most common) that can produce serious or even
fatal allergic reactions.218 If the government imposes federal
regulations protecting one form of allergy, then inevitably pas-
sengers suffering from different allergies will seek protective leg-
islation as well. Of course there are additional concerns,
discussed earlier, that the DOT must address in order to receive
congressional approval of peanut-free buffer zones. Based on
the legislative tone in the records of the congressional debate,
the judicial interpretation of peanut allergies falling outside the
legal disability definition in Land v. Baptist Medical Center, and
the strong lobbying of peanut farmers, it is unlikely the DOT
will succeed in passing this peanut proposal through Congress.
B. CONSEQUENCES OF DOT's PROPOSED PEANUT REGULATION
There has been increased attention nationwide regarding
peanut allergies due to the peanut-free buffer zone proposal.
While heightened awareness of food allergies in general is bene-
ficial to the public at large, recently there has been almost a
frenzied debate regarding peanut allergy accommodations that
has produced some unfavorable results. 219 For example, schools
across the nation are debating the most appropriate and effec-
tive accommodations for students with peanut allergies. Some
school districts, perhaps motivated by fear of liability, have out-
right banned peanuts and peanut products from their cam-
puses. 220 This drastic action has created a great deal of hostility
between parents of allergenic and nonallergenic kids.22'
Most schools have compromised with a less sweeping ap-
proach, such as creating peanut-free lunch tables in the school
217 See S. Con. Res. 117, 105th Cong. (1998).
218 See Debbe Geiger, Just jelly, Thanks/Hold the Peanut Butter, NEWSDAY, Dec. 8,
1998, at A26.
219 See Carrie Hedges, Peanut Ban Spreads to Cafeteria-Schools Worry About Aller-
gies or Lawsuits, USA TODAY, Dec. 3, 1998, at 17A.
220 See id.
221 See id.; see alsoJeanette White, Parents Seek School Ban on Peanuts-Request Pits
Health of One Against Rights of Many, THE SpoKEsMAN Rv., Dec. 15, 1998, at Al.
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cafeterias. 222 Ann Munoz-Fairlong, director of the Food Allergy
Network, argues that a ban on peanuts is both unwise and un-
necessary, and instead underscores the need for educating the
public about food allergies.223 She also believes that the height-
ened press coverage of schools banning peanut butter and simi-
lar products has created a panicked hostility from those not
allergic to peanuts. 224
V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that peanut allergies pose a very real dan-
ger of serious allergic reactions, including, though rarely, death.
The question is, however, whether federal regulation is neces-
sary in order to protect those persons allergic to peanuts.
Although the scope of this comment focuses on the reasonable-
ness of federal regulation of airlines' accommodation to peanut-
allergic passengers, it is clear that this problem is a nationwide
concern (most significantly right now in schools). One issue
that may arise is whether peanut allergies constitute a disability
within the definition of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and/or
the ACAA. If those allergic to peanuts are considered handi-
capped, then every reasonable accommodation must be made in
order to ensure nondiscriminatory treatment of those persons.
Regardless of whether peanut allergy sufferers are found to be
legally disabled, the current public awareness of peanut allergies
will inevitably lead to the creation of safeguards and procedures
in order to accommodate these persons.
This most recent proposed peanut regulation by the DOT is
simply one of many examples of increased federal regulation.
According to the legislative history of the creation of the DOT
and the powers delegated to it by Congress, clearly one purpose
of the DOT is consumer protection, which includes shielding
disabled travelers from discriminatory treatment by airlines. 25
However, some commentators believe that federal legislation
and the resulting lenient judicial interpretation regarding disa-
bilities have actually caused the opposite of the intended effect
by creating a hostility toward those suffering from various disa-
bilities.226 By creating mounds of regulations with which busi-
222 Some schools have accommodated other allergies as well by establishing
milk-free tables, etc. See id.; see also Hedges, supra note 219, at 17A.
223 See The Today Show (NBC television broadcast, November 8, 1998).
224 See id.
225 See 4 9 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
226 See James Bovard, Designer Disabilities, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1998, at A14.
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nesses must comply, Congress has taken away an inherent desire
of corporations to willingly accommodate their customers and
fellow human beings. 7
Air carriers have for years accommodated passengers with
peanut allergies according to corporate policies and well-estab-
lished procedures. For example, British Airways started serving
corn chips and other snacks instead of peanuts over a year ago,
although they do serve peanuts upon requests. 228 A spokesman
for the airline stated that this change in policy was not due to
DOT regulations, but that the airline "did it on [their] own"
because of the complaints received from peanut-allergic passen-
gers for several years. 229 Both Southwest Airlines, which cannot
create peanut-free buffer zones because it does not assign seats,
and Continental Airlines will remove peanuts from the flight if
an allergic passenger notifies the airline in advance.23 ° Yet other
airlines, such as America West and Qantas Airways, plan to
phase out peanuts as their supply is depleted and to serve alter-
nate snacks such as raisins.23 1 The DOT's proposal has created
not only a nationwide debate, but also increased complexity for
airlines in accommodating allergenic passengers. Most likely,
the DOT will not gain congressional approval for federally-man-
dated peanut-free zones, and air carriers will continue to accom-
modate any passenger's allergy to peanuts according to their
own well-established and efficient procedures.
227 See id.
228 See Doheny, supra note 205, at L12.
229 Id.
230 See id.
231 See id.
1999]
I4LAS. It*'
Articles
0 41LA 
. It*
